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REPORT
Number 24-June 1978

The Coal Tax Challenge
by
James J. Lopach*

The State of Montana is facing a challenge to its coal
severance tax. Four coal mining companies doing business
in the state have paid their first quarter 1978 tax under
protest, alleging for various reasons that the tax is in
violation of the United States Constitution and law. The
controversy threatens to result in a court action and
potential invalidation of the highest coal tax in the nation.
At stake for Montana is a major revenue source and a
handful of innovative programs dependent for their funding
upon the tax.
The present and projected levels of coal production in the
state make the coal tax issue one of major significance. In
1969 a little over one million tons of coal were mined in
Montana, and the amount increased to over 26 million tons
in 1976. The Montana Energy Research and Conserv-ation
Office predicts that in excess of 96 million tons will be mined
in 1990. Severance tax collections have been equally
impressive. The state tax collector counted $23 million and
$34 million in fiscal years 1976 and 1977 respectively. The
projections for the next two fiscal years are $47 million and
$56 million. All of this wealth was anticipated by the
Montana legislators who enacted the severance tax.
Legislative Intent

The conference committee that forged the compromise
settlement in the 1975 legislature viewed its product more as
a revenue than a regulatory measure. The bill routinely was
referred to as the major producer of new revenue to be
introduced during the session. The coal revenue ensured a
balanced general fund budget for the biennium, and in fact,
it helped to generate a budgetary surplus. The conference
committee defended its proposal by saying it was motivated
by the state's financial needs and not by other states' designs
for coal development in Montana.
The probable impact of the severance tax on other states
and their citizens did not escape Montana legislators.
Arguments were heard that the tax would cause economic
retaliation and hostility between Montana and coal
consuming states. Legislators, however, had firsthand
knowledge of captive consumption and chose to imitate
Alberta's pricing policy for natural gas. The conference
report noted that Alberta had invested its royalty payments
in universities, hospitals, and tax reductions and concluded
that "the consumers of Alberta gas in Montana and
elsewhere have no choice but to finance this program." This
result to the north was far more desirable than Wyoming's
seven percent tax on the mine price of coal and disorderly

coal development. The Montana Legislature, consequently,
decided to saddle both in-state and out-of-state coal users
with the costs of alleviating the impact of coal development
and increasing the flow of revenue to the state's general fund.
The 1975 severance tax as enacted provided that surfacemined coal with a heating quality of under 7,000 Btu per
pound would be taxed at 20 percent of its contract sales
price. A tax of 30 percent of value would be imposed on
stripped coal in excess of7 ,000 Btu. The act repealed the coal
mines license taxes and deleted coal from the provisions
taxing the net proceeds of mines. One stated purpose of the
legislation accordingly was "to simplify the structure of coal
taxation in Montana, reducing tax overlap and improving
the predictability of tax projections." The act also provided
that counties were to levy a tax on the gross proceeds from
coal just as on other forms of property, and it left intact the
1973 Resource Indemnity Trust Act which placed a tax of
one-half of one percent on the gross value of non-renewable
natural resources, including coal, at the time of their being
mined. Income from the trust account was intended "to
improve the total environment and rectify damage thereto."
Under this act the people of Montana were to be indemnified
for the extraction of non-renewable natural resources.
The distribution formula for the revenue gained under the
coal severance tax was the subject of considerable debate
during the 1975 legislative session. Since that time the
formula has been altered by both subsequent legislation and
a constitutional amendment. Currently 25 percent of the
coal tax revenue goes to the trust fund created by Article IX,
Section 5 of the Montana Constitution, whose income can
be spent by a majority vote of the legislature but whose
principal is inviolable lacking a three-fourths vote of both
houses. The remaining 75 percent of the total collections is
allocated in the following proportions: two percent to the
county in which the coal is mined to be spent at the discretion
of the governing body; two and one-half percent for
alternative energy research development and
demonstration; 26 and one-half percent for a local impact
and education trust account which is allocated by the
Montana Coal Board through a grant program; 13 percent
for coal area highway improvement; ten percent for state
equalization aid for public schools; one percent for county
land planning; two and one-half percent for a loan program
to develop renewa ble resources such as water; two and onehalf percent for acquisition and management of parks and
cultural and aesthetic projects; and the balance to the state
general fund.,
Local Impact Grants

*Chairman, Department of Political Science, and Director, Bureau of
Government Research, University of Montana.

The Coal Board's program oflocal impact grants has been

Olcott Cohea, "Coal Board Grants," January 11, 1978) also
vindicated the exercise of legislative oversight. The
researcher found that coal communities had by then taken
care of their "most pressing needs," such as school
expansion, water and sewage system improvement, and road
and fire fighting equipment. The time had come to question
whether coal communities were unjustifiably receiving
preferential treatment. Specifically, the Coal Tax Oversight
Committee was asked to consider:

supervised by the legislature as to the efficacy of spent coal
tax dollars. Through a system of proposals and awards, coal
tax revenue was to help remedy the havoc caused by coal
mining. The Coal Board was authorized by the 1975
severance tax bill to "assist local governmental units in
meeting the local impact of coal development by enabling
them to adequately provide governmental services and
facilities which are needed as a direct consequence of coal
development." The legislature further provided that the Coal
Board should take the following standards into
consideration in making grants: I) need, 2) severity of impact
from coal development, 3) degree of local effort in meeting
needs, and 4) availability of funds. The Coal Board
subsequently formulated rules to sharpen the legislature's
criteria. "Need" was interpreted to be "a direct and obvious
threat to the public health, safety or welfare that has been
caused as a direct result of coal development." "Severity of
impact" was characterized as "rapidity of growth and
subsequent expansion of the problem and the number of
people affected." "Local effort" was defined in terms of
"bonding and millage efforts."
The Coal Board has not been hesitant in funding
proposals to spend coal severance tax revenue. As of
December, 1977, the board had awarded grants totalling
$14,766,063 and denied or tabled requests for $8,286,919.
The propriety of these awards has concerned the legislature,
and studies by two agencies inquired into the Coal Board's
meeting of legislative intent.
A report by the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst
(Robert J. Robinson, "Coal Impact and Coal Board
Grants," September 20, 1977) found that some Coal Board
grants were more akin to tax relief than essential impact aid
although this finding is qualified by the kind of local
government unit receiving the award. Coal area counties and
school districts, unlike incorporated towns, have
experienced substantially increased taxable valuations
"because of the existence of new generating facilities and
mining equipment and the inclusion of the gross proceeds of
coal sales on the property tax rolls." Rosebud and Big Horn
counties, .the areas certified by the Department of State
Lands as having the most significant coal development, were
discovered to have low mill levies when compared to
counties of similar geographic and population size, and thus
they possessed "substantial unused fiscal capacity to meet
public needs occasioned by coal development." The taxable
valuations of incorporated towns, on the other hand, had
not increased parallel with coal development, and towns
pushed their mill levy to the legal maximum in order to deal
with large population growth. With one exception the report
found Coal Board grants to school districts unwarranted on
two grounds: either increased enrollments had not been
experienced or increased tax valuations were more than
sufficient to support rising enrollments. The conclusion of
the analysis represents a partial assessment of the Coal
Board's realization of the legislature's objectives:

1) whether the percentage of coal tax revenue flowing to the coal
impact fund is appropriate; 2) whether a loan system rather than grants
would be more equitable in areas where taxable valuation will increase;
3) whether the current statutory criteria for making grants are
adequate; and 4) to what level of services and facilities should coal
impact grants bring a coal-impacted community?

It is one thing for the legislature to say that programs for
the use of the coal severance tax should be changed and an
entirely different matter for a court to conclude that the tax
is in violation of the United States Constitution and law. The
record of the local impact grant program could be
mentioned in a legal attack on the severance tax. One of the
grounds for the protest of the Decker Coal Co.,
Westmoreland Resources Inc., Western Energy Co., and
Peabody Coal Co. is that the severance tax bears no
reasonable relationship to the benefits derived from the
State of Montana by the taxpayers. If the severance taxbased local impact grants are superfluous, however, that
program under the tax should be termed excessive by the
legislature. A judicial decision on the constitutionality and
legality of the severance tax would not be grounded in one
use of the tax but would be made in the context of several
applicable legal doctrines that have evolved through the
years. Predicting the fate of the challenge to the Montana
coal tax must rest on an appreciation of these principles and
precedents.

Legal Challenge

The four protesting coal producers rested their challenge
on grounds in addition to an imbalance between burden and
benefits. Arguments raised at the time of the protested tax
payments included discrimination by Montana against nonresidents engaged in interstate commerce, violation of the
rights of equal protection and due process guranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and frustration and impairment of federal laws and policies.
The assertion that Montana is unduly restraining interstate
commerce is part of the argument that the costs of the tax
outweigh the services the state provides.
If the protested tax payments eventually result in a court
action, which is apparently the intent of the coal companies,
one of the challengers' arguments seemingly would warrant
early dismissal. This is the equal protection claim that the
Montana tax discriminates between Montana and out-ofstate producers and consumers. Discrimination is a question
of the acceptability of a statutory classification, and the
standard used by courts in economic matters since 1937 is
whether the legislature had a "reasonable" or "rational"
basis for establishing separate categories. The Montana law
makes no distinctions but states, "A severance tax is imposed
on each ton of coal produced in the state. . .." Courts
historically have been very watchful for discrimination
against interstate commerce in favor of home-state interests.
The intent of the founding fathers in placing the Interstate
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution was

Our review of counties, incorporated towns and school districts in
the areas certified as impacted by coal development shows that, with
few exceptions, the impacted units have the means to finance the
required expenses without state support. The coal area is characterized
by some of the lowest mill levies in the state and has been blessed by
mushrooming property valuations.
This analysis would indicate that the need for state supported local
impact grants may be much less than originally anticipated by the
legislature.

A later study by the Montana Legislative Council (Teresa
2

rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax agains_t ~om~erce
Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an act1v1ty with a
substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the
services provided by the State" [Complete Auto Transit. Inc. \'. Bradr,
51 L Ed 2d 326, 331 (1977)].

exactly to prevent commercial barriers from being raised
between the states. But this motive or result is entirely absent
from the Montana coal severance tax.
A reviewing court has available to it another rationale
with which it could resolve the tax challenge. Coal
companies are alleging that the Montana tax places an
undue burden on the flow of interstate commerce and that
the state policy interferes with established federal policies
concerning coal mining that have been passed pursuant to
Congress' power "To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." A critical issue is what constitutes interstate
commerce, for the state is free to tax goods and activities.
within its own jurisdiction. Years ago the United States
Supreme Court ruled:

The reasoning of the court is related to the due process and
burden-versus-benefit challenges raised by the coal
companies concerning the Montana coal tax. Due process,
adequacy of benefits, and fair apportionment are all
essentially a matter of connection or nexus between the
taxing state and the taxed activities.
The attention of a court in scrutinizing the effect of a state
tax on interstate commerce is fastened on the degree of
connection between the taxingjurisdiction and the interstate
activities taking place within the ·taxing state. For several
reasons due process will not admit of a state taxing interstate
operations that are not related to its jurisdiction. From a
procedural perspective the court will question a serious
abuse of taxation without representation; the substantive
issue is whether the taxing jurisdiction and taxpayer are
sufficiently connected so that the taxpayer can be construed
as a recipient of the taxing state's services. Legitimate
compensation for benefits receiv ed is not nullified, however,
if the tax proceeds find their way into the state general fund
instead of being applied to services directly related to the
taxed activities [Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of
Railroad Commissioners, 322 U.S. 495 (1947)]. The United
States Supreme Court also has held that the benefit or nexus
required by due process is satisfied by the taxing state
providing the interstate concern the "substantial privilege of
carrying on business" in the state [Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney
Co. 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940)].
The concern of the court in the Complete Auto Transit
case with fair tax apportionment should have no bearing on
the Montana law. The prohibition under the Commerce
Clause relates to a series of states placing the same kind of
tax on interstate commerce. Such cumulative taxation is
clearly an undue burden on interstate commerce, but a state
tax reasonably tied to uniquely local aspects of interstate
commerce avoids this defect. Because the Montana tax rests
on the act of extracting coal which necessarily can occur in
only one state, fair apportionment is not a valid ground upon
which to challenge the tax. Substantial connection between
Montana and severance of coal thus would seem to save the
coal tax from invalidation under the commerce and due
process clauses.
The final basis of the anticipated coal company challenge
is the doctrine of federal preemption, i.e., the Montana tax is
in conflict with some explicit federal law or policy and thus
must give way. Such a conclusion must be derived from
careful interpretation of the federal statute in each specific
situation, and Congress is assumed to have full power to
preclude the states from regulating any aspect of interstate
commerce. Where Congressional intent to occupy a field is
clear or where state regulation actually conflicts with
operation of a federal program, a court's finding of federal
preemption is warranted. The underlying rationale is that
the states cannot be allowed to frustrate duly authorized
federal regulation regardless of the federal program's
longevity or stage of implementation. The mere existence of
some federal activity, however, does not indicate an
intention to preempt, and state and federal regulation can
exist side-by-side, especially if the state is concerning itself
with essentially local matters. The United States Supreme

... goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the
State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual
way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier
for transportation to another State, or have started upon such
transportation in a continuous route or journey [Coe v. Town of Errol,
116 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1886)].

The court in its opinion also made some comments that were
extraneous to its decision but highly relevant to Montana's
current situation. Concern was expressed that an opposite
holding seriously would weaken the fiscal condition of
western states. If the intent to ship out of state would free
goods from a state tax, then the tax base of a basically
exporting state thereby would be eroded.
Two subsequent cases add special weight to the Coe v.
Errol rule. In 1922 the Supreme Court upheld a state ad
valorem tax on coal mined in the state even though there
were fixed plans for shipping the coal out of the state. The
court said that the tax in fact was not on goods that had
entered the stream of commerce [Heislerv. Thomas Colliery
Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922)]. Fifty years later, the Supreme
Court reiterated its longstanding rule and said articles
cannot claim immunity from a state tax until they actually
begin "physical entry into the stream of exportation. We find
no reason to depart from that settled doctrine" [Kosydar v.
National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974)].
If the court reviewing the severance tax were to determine
that coal should be treated as interstate commerce, several
avenues of analysis would be available. The tax could be
interpreted as being primarily a regulation rather than a
revenue measure. Viewing the tax in this manner, the court
would evaluate the impact of the tax on interstate commerce
by means of a balancing test. The tax, treated as a regulation,
would be upheld if the state's interest in enforcing the
measure outweighed the burden it imposed on interstate
commerce. Several considerations would be central in the
court's balancing of competing interests. The tax would have
a greater chance of being upheld if it regulated local as
opposed to national concerns, aimed at protecting the state's
general welfare rather than its business concerns, and had
not overlooked other regulatory alternatives that were less
burdensome for interstate commerce. Such an approach by
the court is unlikely, however, as the intent of the Montana
Legislature clearly was to enact a major revenue measure.
It is thus more probable that a court would assess the
impact on interstate commerce as being occasioned by a
bona fide tax. In a very recent case the United States
Supreme Court indicated the proper test to apply in such a
situation. Prior decisions, the court said,
... have considered not the formal language of the tax statute, but

3

Court has said that it will not lightly presume federal
preemption when Congress enters "a field which the States
have traditionally occupied" [Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)]. To find Congressional
preemption of a state revenue program such as the ~o~tana
coal tax would take discovery of some uncharactenstlcally
pointed ,s tatutory language restricting a revenue source to
federal use only.
A different kind of preemption rests with the judicial
branch as opposed to Congress, and here most probably is
the greatest threat to the Montana coal tax. Courts can
invoke the "dormant" commerce power to ban state
regulation of interstate commerce because of conflict with
what Congress could but did not do. The classic formulation
of this doctrine is found in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945), where the Supreme Court said that the
judge's role is to weigh the benefits of local control against an
independent judicial interpretation of competing national
interests, given Congress' silence on the subject. Under the
"dormant" congressional power doctrine the court is the
arbiter of the scope of the federal commerce power and
decides if a state regulation constitutes an unjustifiable
burden on interstate commerce.
Courts have used the dormant commerce power doctrine
to invalidate state regulation of activities that unmistakably
are aspects of interstate commerce. A serious challenge to
the Montana coal tax would arise if a court were to apply the
doctrine not to state regulation of interstate commerce but to
a state tax on an intrastate activity that is closely related to
interstate commerce- mining. The United States Supreme
Court has frequently upheld Congressional extension of its
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause to purely
intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce [Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342
(1914); N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. , 301
U.S. I (1937)]. The Supreme Court has not, however,
independently used the dormant commerce power doctrine
to nullify state regulation of intrastate activities because of
what Congress at some future time might do if it extended its
commerce power to its broadest and most imaginative reach.
It seems highly unlikely that a court would take such an
independent leap into the policy arena, as the Supreme

Court has required a clear Congressional stat~ment .of
purpose before upholding Congress' own extens10n of its
commerce power to activities traditionally regulated at the
state level [U.S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973)].
Conclusion
The challenge to the Montana coal tax rests on
questionable grounds. Because miriing is peculi.arly a local
activity, the coal tax is within the state's authonty to en~ct,
precludes cumulative taxation~ an? i~ a norma.l cos! of doing
business. The tax does not d1scnminate against interstate
commerce as it applies to production for in-state and out-ofstate consumption alike. Congress has not reserved coal to
itself as a source of income, and no existing federal law
preempts such a legitimate state revenue plan. Only if the
courts were to find a hidden intent in the Commerce Clause
of the national constitution to ban a state levy on a local
activity should the Montana tax fall. B~t Congress' long a.nd
difficult struggle to formulate a nat10nal energy pohcy
makes the courts' assumption of this role completely
unjustifiable.
·
.
Unlike many states, Montana cannot rely on extensive
industrial properties, expanding personal incomes, or
voluminous commercial transactions as reliable sources for
financing the ever increasing cost of government. Much of
Montana's wealth is in its natural resources that throughout
the state's history have been exported for processing and use
elsewhere. As a result, the state's economy radically has been
tied to forces and decisions beyond its control. The Montana
coal tax is a levy on the severance of a major state resource. It
is a rational attempt to level out the complex, and largely
unforeseeable, costs of coal development.
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